Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2009

Michael Ward v. Caroline Coats Graydon and Peter
Coats: Unknown
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Bruce D. Panzer; Blackburn & Stoll; Craig S. Cook;.
Brad C. Smith; Samuel A. Hood; Stevenson & Smith; Attorney for petitioner.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Ward v. Graydon, No. 20090714 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1839

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Case No. 20090714 CA

MICHAEL WARD,
Petitioner, Appellant, and Cross-Appellee

Trial Court. No. 080903379

vs.
CAROLINE COATS GRAYDON,
Respondent and Appellee;
and
PETER COATS,
Respondent, Appellee, and
Cross-Appellant.

BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEE MICHAEL WARD

On Appeal from the Third District Court for Salt Lake County,
Honorable Denise P. Lindberg
Bryce D. Panzer, No. 2509
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC
257 E. 200 S., Ste. 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Caroline Coats Graydon
Craig S.Cook, No. 713
3645 East Cascade Way
Salt Lake City, UT 84109
Attorney for Peter Coats

Brad C. Smith, No. 6656
Samuel A. Hood, No. 13245
STEVENSON & SMiTH, P.C.
3986 Washington Boulevard
Ogden. UT 84401
Telephone: (801) 394-4573
Facsimile: (801) 399-9954
Attorney for Michael Ward

UTAH

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Case No. 20090714 CA

MICHAEL WARD,
Petitioner, Appellant, and Cross-Appellee

Trial Court. No. 080903379

vs.
CAROLINE COATS GRAYDON,
Respondent and Appellee;
and
PETER COATS,
Respondent, Appellee, and
Cross-Appellant.

BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEE MICHAEL WARD

On Appeal from the Third District Court for Salt Lake County,
Honorable Denise P. Lindberg
Bryce D. Panzer, No. 2509
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC
257 E. 200 S., Ste. 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Caroline Coats Graydon
Craig S. Cook, No. 713
3645 East Cascade Way
Salt Lake City, UT 84109
Attorney for Peter Coats

Brad C. Smith, No. 6656
Samuel A. Hood, No. 13245
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
3986 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, UT 84401
Telephone: (801) 394-4573
Facsimile: (801) 399-9954
Attorney for Michael Ward

TABLE OF CONTENTS
L
1L

J1L

THE LOWER COURT MADE NO ERROR IN AWARDING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO MICHAEL WARD
2
BECAUSE COATS BREACHED THE DUTIES INHERENT IN JOINT
TENANCY. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT TO WARD
6
NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION OCCURRED BELOW
12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Fisher v. Bank of Spanish Fork. 74 P.2d 659, 661 (Utah 1937)
5
Jolieyv. Corry, 671 P.2d 139 (Utah 1983)
9
Moon Lake Electric Ass'n v. Ultrasvstems W. Constructors. Inc., 767 P.2d
125, 128 (Utah App. 1988)
14
Pitts v. McLachlan, 567 P.2d 171
3

ARGUMENT
I.

THE LOWER COURT MADE NO ERROR IN AWARDING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO MICHAEL WARD
Cross-Appellant Peter Coats argues that because the lower court

characterized—at least in part—his failure to respond in the summary
judgment proceedings below as a default, the judgment of the lower court
is vulnerable to direct attack on that basis. Ward questions whether this
proposition is a matter of settled law. While Coats has admittedly made a
colorable argument as to the potential invalidity of the concept of default in
2

a summary judgr 3nt oroceeding, he has produced no authority directly
stating the prop

he advances. Ward wishes to point out that there is

at least one fairly recent example in Utah jurisprudence where an appellate
court has (at least tacitly) recognized the concept of default in the context
of summary judgment. See Pitts v. McLachian, 567 P.2d 171, 171, 174
(Utah 1977) (denying on unrelated grounds the reversal of a summary
judgment order that the Court characterized as having been entered on
default).
Furthermore, Coats essentially would have this Court believe that the
lower court made no substantive examination of the summary judgment
pleadings, and simply awarded judgment on the basis of Coats' failure to
respond. However, this is incorrect—the court below did not find for Ward
solely on the basis of "default." In fact, the court stated as a preface to its
order granting summary judgment against Coats. "[t]he Court having
considered the motions, the memoranda filed by Plaintiff and Defendant
Graydon (the Court having noted that Defendant Peter Coats had not filed
any opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment) and the
arguments presented at the hearing, and good cause appearing, it is
hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed . . . ." Order on Summary
Judgment Motions and Judgment (emphasis added). In so doing, the lower
3

court made it clear that its judgment against Coats was not solely
predicated upon his failure to respond, but upon motions, memoranda,
arguments at hearing, and good cause appearing. This is further
demonstrated by the lower court's minute entry from Coats' Rule 59 motion
proceedings, which Coats quotes in his brief to this Court.
On August 31, 2009, Coats, now represented by counsel, filed the
present [Rule 59/60 motion. Plaintiff has opposed the motion and
explained why Coates is not entitled to reiief from judgment under
either rule 59 or Rule 60. The Court agrees entirely with the
plaintiff's analysis and incorporates herein oy reference. The
analysis therein more than adequately supports the court's
determination that Coats' motions fail.
Brief of Peter Coats^lS.
The lower court did not—as seemingly alleged by Coats—
abrogate its duty to examine the merits of the claims in the summary
judgment, and did not make its decision solely on Coats' failure to
respond. A ruling that Ward's claims on summary judgment were
legally sufficient is—at the very least—implicit in the lower court's ruling.
That court's treatment of Coats' Rule 59 and 60 claims for reiief from
judgment illustrate this even more clearly.
Furthermore, even if the lower court's ruling was in fact solely based
on Coats' failure to respond to Ward's summary judgment motion, this court
is not required to overturn it. Ward's position remains unchanged with
regard to the legal claims he raised in the summary judgment, and he
4

maintains that those claims are adeauate to demonstrate Coats' liability.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that:
A right ruiing sustainable on correct legal reasoning, even though
such correct reasoning takes in legal syllogisms not entertained by
the lower court, will be upheld even though the lower court based
the ruiing on wrong legal reasoning. The appellate court is not
confined to an examination of the correctness of the legal
propositions on which the lower court based its ruiing, but will
examine the correctness of the ruiing and may sustain it on
reasoning which involved an entirely different chain of legal
syllogisms.
Fisher v. Bank of Spanish Fork. 74 P.2d 659, 661 (Utah 1937).
This Court need not reverse the finding of the lower court simpiy
because of the "default" language, even if Coats is correct in alleging its
error. Rather, the decision should be upheld on the legal merits of the
claims Ward made below.
Coats further erroneously alleges that the burden carried by a movant
for summary judgment is "no different than what occurs in a criminal case."
In fact, the burdens are hardly analogous at all. In a criminal case, the
prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
certain facts occurred. If this burden is carried adequately, the defendant is
supposed to be convicted of a crime befitting the proven facts. Summary
judgment is altogether different. The mere existence of material facts in
dispute is sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment—a movant's
ability to prove those facts is immaterial to the motion's survival. In this
5

case, Coats has admitted to the facts alleged by Michael Ward in the
summary judgment. This means tnat to prevail on that motion, Ward
needed only to have alleged a proper legal claim against Coats that was
supported by the facts Coats admitted. If Coats wishes to make
comparisons to the criminal law arena, this situation is more analogous to a
defendant stipulating to the prosecution's alleged facts (which would—
under most circumstances imaginable—have the same effect as a guilty
plea). Coats acts as if his concession to Ward's alleged facts is a small
matter. Rather, his acceptance of the undisputed facts and failure to
dispute the proper legal claims brought by Ward indeed entitle Ward to
summary judgment under the very standard Coats advances.

II.

BECAUSE COATS BREACHED THE DUTIES INHERENT IN JOINT
TENANCY, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO WARD
Coats'denial of liability is premised on his erroneous argument that

the trial court erred because it based its grant of summary judgment on
Coats' failure to oppose the motion rather than the substantive law
underlying Ward's claim. To support his proposition. Coats mistakenly
claims that Ward did not cite any legal authority on which the court could
have based its judgment. But Coats' argument and concomitant
6

conclusion, based on a misreading of the court's order, are incorrect. In
the motion and hearing for summary judgment, Ward did articulate a legal
theory of Coats' liability, and the court accepted that theory as a basis for
recovery. Contrary to Coats' assertion, the court did not base its judgment
on his failure to file a responsive pleading; rather the court adopted the
theory advocated by Ward. As he acknowledges in his brief, Coats
attended the hearing on summary judgment, and the court allowed him to
make an argument in opposition to the motion. That the court did not find
his legal theory persuasive does not mean that the court's judgment was in
error. If error occurred in this case, it belonged to Coats, who did not
obtain representation and chose not to file a responsive pleading.1
Predictably unhappy with the court's unsurprising decision, Coats is now
asking this Court to do what the trial court refused to: rescue him from his
own dereliction by reversing the grant of summary judgment. However,
because the legal theory advocated by Ward provides a sufficient basis for

1

Curiously, Coats makes no effort in his brief to explain why he failed to
respond to the motion for summary judgment, instead, his brief is laced
with a series of hypotheticais intended to posit how the outcome
theoretically may have been different had Coats hired an attorney (i.e.,
what if Coats had filed a cross-motion for summary judgment against
Ward). But Coats' speculative conjecture is irrelevant, since Utah law
provides that parties that represent themselves will be held to the same
standard of knowledge and practice as a qualified member of the bar.
Hampton v. Professional Title Services, 2010 UT App. 294 % 3.
7

the trial court's decision, summary judgment in favor of Ward should be
sustained.
Because cotenancy creates a cooperative community of interest
dependent upon good faith, Utah law imposes duties and obligations upon
cotenants. Coats seeks refuge from iiability by claiming that the trial court
predicated its grant of summary judgment on the narrow grounds that
Coats was obligated to agree to escrow the proceeds of the sale.
According to Coats' brief, his failure to agree to Graydon's conditions on
the sale of the property was the only transgression alleged by Ward, and
therefore must have been the basis for the court's decision. This is simply
incorrect. Ward's iegal proposition, upon which the court granted summary
judgment, isthe broader point that by virtue of their joint interests, cotenants
stand in a unique relationship to one another, and that under the specific
and unusual facts and circumstances of this case, Coats' refusal to
cooperate in the sale of the property violated the reciprocal obligations
inherent in the community of interest shared by Graydon, Coats, and Ward.
Utah law recognizes that a special relationship of confidence and
trust exists among cotenants. In Jolley v. Corry, 671 P.26 139 (Utah
1983).Utah's Supreme Court reaffirmed the existence of such a relationship
and indicated that it necessarily included the imposition of obligations upon
8

cotenants. Without reaching the question of whether those obligations rose
to the level of a fiduciary duty, the Jolley Court concluded that the
relationship among cotenants precluded one from defaulting on an
obligation and then attempting to extinguish the interest of the others by
purchasing the property at a foreclosure sale. While the Utah Supreme
Court in Jolley opted not to decide whether a cotenant is under a fiduciary
duty in every conceivable circumstance, the Court made two points clear:
1) in at least some circumstances, cotenants have a fiduciary duty to one
another; and 2) without using the label of "fiduciary," cotenants have
obligations to one another, the violation of which warrants legal redress.
Whatever we call these responsibilities, whether fiduciary duties, reciprocal
obligations, or otherwise, is immaterial; regardless of the label, mutual
duties are an innate part of membership in the community of interest
among cotenants. At the very least, this duty includes an obligation to not
obstruct or impede a cotenant's efforts to enjoy his interest in the property.
In the present case, the actions of Coats and Graydon have jointly
denied Ward the value of the property he owned as a cotenant. Unlike
Coats' attenuated theory relating to a nonexistent duty to escrow the
proceeds of the sale, Coats and Graydon engaged in a dangerous course
of conduct that fundamentally deprived their cotenant, an innocent third
9

party, of his interest in the property. Coats' and Graydon's obstinate
intransigence in the face of certain injury was more than a simple exercise
of their right to be stubborn; it was a breach of their obligations to their
cotenant.
As a part of their divorce proceedings, and more than a year before
the events giving rise to this action, Coats and Graydon had been ordered
by the court to sell the property in dispute. Despite having had a year in
which to sell the property, by January 2007 no purchaser had been found
and the property was being foreclosed on. With a trustee's sale scheduled
for 17 February 2007, Coats and Graydon knew that if they failed to sell the
property prior to that date, it would be subject to a foreclosure sale at a
substantially lower price than a private transaction would bring. None of
the parties involved dispute that the value of the property was at least $5.2
million, an amount well above the price it would sell for at a trustee's sale.
In other words, Coats and Graydon absolutely knew that if the property did
not sell before February 17. both of them, along with their cotenant Ward,
would lose a significant amount of money. Yet even in the face of this
certain loss, theyopted for a resolute and unyielding state of paralysis.
Despite a binding agreement to sell the property to Hagen, Coats and
Graydon allowed their tangential divorce to obstruct their clarity of thought.
10

and chose financial dissipation instead of cooperation and compromise.
Coats seeks to justify his actions on the grounds that his refusal to
agree to escrow the proceeds of the sale was reasonable and within his
rights; it was neither. At the time Coats had two alternatives: agree to
escrow the proceeds in order to complete the sale to Hagen; or refuse, let
the agreement dissolve, and suffer a ioss in foreclosure. He had absolutely
nothing to lose by agreeing to escrow, as under either alternative, Coats'
proceeds from the sale would be subject to division in the pending divorce.
Thus, his choice involved only the amount, not the outcome, of the
proceeds of the sale. Had Coats agreed to escrow those proceeds, he
stood to make more money. Instead, he refused, received a significantly
diminished return, and had to pay Graydon the value of her resulting loss.
In no way were his actions reasonable. And while Coats—and Graydon for
that matter—may have the right to engage in the frivolous economic waste
of their marital assets, those rights terminate when their actions impact the
interests a third party. In light of the fact that he knew it would injure Ward,
Coats' obdurate refusal to escrow the money was not within his rights.
Under the circumstances of this case, Ward is similar to a minority
shareholder in a closely held corporation. Holding less than 10% of the
interest in the property, Ward was at the mercy of the majority owners,
11

Coats and Graydon. As a minority owner of a noniiquid asset with no
market, Ward was left vulnerable with no ability to protect his interest. His
only hope was that his cotenants would act fairly and in good faith. Their
failure to do either warrants the imposition of liability for their breach of the
obligations imposed by their duties as cotenants. As a result, the trial
court's grant of summary judgment should be sustained.

III.

NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION OCCURRED BELOW
Coats misses the mark with his arguments about evidence

marshaling and his addendum attempting to demonstrate his efforts at
same. Evidentiary arguments are inappropriate here. Evidence is offered
for the purpose of establishing facts. The facts in this case became
undisputed when Peter Coats failed to controvert them at the summary
judgment stage.2 As such, whether it was proper for Michael Ward to
receive judgment against Coats in the proceedings below was purely a
question of law at both the summary judgment and Rule 59 stages.
Sufficiency of evidence was a wholly inappropriate standard for Coats to
rely upon at the Rule 59 stage. The portion of Rule 59(a)(6) dealing with
sufficiency of evidence applies to situations where verdicts have been
2

Moreover, Coats acknowledges still that the facts in this case are
undisputed. Brief of Peter Coats 10.
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rendered after parties have presented evidence at trial—not to
uncontroverted summary judgment motions, where facts were established
by either agreement or failure to controvert the movant's version of them. If
the court ignored Coats sufficiency-of-evidence claims at the Rule 59
stage, it was because they were irrelevant. There were—and still are—no
findings of fact in the case to challenge. Coats' entire addendum to his
brief, along with the argument it contains, simply serves to confuse the
issue.
The only pertinent question during the Rule 59 stage was whether the
judgment against Peter Coats was correct as a matter of law. By quoting
language from Judge Lindberg's Minute Entry Order in his own brief,
(reproduced in section I above) Coats has shown that the trial court
engaged in a legal analysis on that question, and declined to reverse its
earlier decision.
Furthermore, Coats misapprehends the legal standard involved in a
Rule 59 motion. For example, a court "has no discretion to grant a new trial
absent a showing of one of the circumstances specified in Utah R. Civ. P.
59(a)." Coats has failed to state in his brief in what manner he, or anyone
else made a showing of any of those circumstances (other than the
previously mentioned "sufficiency of evidence" argument), and thus has not
13

even demonstrated that the court below ever had the option o-' ranting a
new trial.
Coats seems to simply make the argument that the court's supposed
abuse of discretion lay in its failure to reverse itself and find for Coats the
second time around. Indeed, at another prominent point in the argument,
Coats asserts that "Peter's action [in refusing the escrow arrangement] was
not unlawful, in breach of contract, or in violation of any court order" Coats
follows this conclusory language with yet another assertion that "the
evidence is clearly insufficient that he did anything intentionally or
wrongfully to prevent the sale of the property to Mr. Hagen." In fact, there
is much about Coats' behavior that wrongfully prevented the sale. As a
cotenant—and therefore a fiduciary—of Michael Ward, Coats was under an
obligation not to diminish the value of the property. Coats was under an
obligation to sell the property, both from an order of the divorce court, and
from the impending trustee's sale attendant to Isabel Coats' foreclosure.
He had a duty to ensure that the impending and inevitable sale net as
much profit as possible. His intransigence in refusing to cooperate, along
with that of Caroline Coats Graydon, ensured the demise of the Hagen
deal, and thereby diminished the vaiue of Michael Ward's interest in the
property.
14

Peter Coats has failed to make a coherent legal argument in support
of his abuse of discretion claim. Furthermore, Coats has failed to allege
any pertinent facts in support of that claim. Accordingly, that claim must
fail.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant/Cross-Appellee Michael Ward
respectfully asks this Court to uphold the trial court s award of summary
judgment to Michael Ward against Peter Coats.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s ^ day of November. 2010.
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.

Brad C. Smith
Samuel A. Hood
Attorneys for Michael Ward
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